Hence, this fact may also be clearly recognised, that when these three are expressed, either by themselves or by another, there are not more beings than one expressed. Wretches that we are, whence have we been driven out; whither are we driven on? For, the rational mind, as to which no bodily sense can perceive what, or of what character, or how great, it is --the less this rational mind would be if it were any of those things that are in the scope of the bodily senses, the greater it is than any of these. Since every word by which an object is thus mentally expressed is the likeness of that object, if this is not the word corresponding to the objects that have been created through it, how shall we be sure that it is the Word? But since, as our reasoning shows, it is equally certain that whatever the supreme Substance created, it created through nothing other than itself; and whatever it created, it created through its own most intimate expression, whether separately, by the utterance of separate words, or all at once, by the utterance of one word; what conclusion can be more evidently necessary, than that this expression of the supreme Being is no other than the supreme Being? For it seems to be rightly said, that place is predicable only of objects whose magnitude place contains by including it, and includes by containing it; and that time is predicable only of objects whose duration time ends by measuring it, and measures by ending it. Truly, I see it not, because it is too bright for me. Instead, upon the archbishop's death in 1089, —William Rufus or William the Red—refused the appointment of any successor and appropriated the see's lands and revenues for himself. But, if any lesser nature derives existence from the material of the supreme good, inasmuch as nothing exists whencesoever, except through the supreme Being, the supreme good is subjected to change and corruption through the supreme Being itself. For, each taken separately is essentially memory and intelligence and love, and all that is necessarily inherent in the supreme Being.
And hence it is truth itself, just as thou art; no other truth than thou; and thou art of so simple a nature, that of thee nothing can be born other than what thou art. Moreover, it cannot have inception from or through itself, although it exists from and through itself. For, not only does it owe its very existence to its creator; but the fact that it is known to have no power so important as that of remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the supreme good, proves that it ought to wish nothing else so especially. But, whatever exists in any of these three ways exists through another than itself, and is of later existence, and, in some sort, less than that through which it obtains existence. Every human soul is immortal. This Being is in all things, and throughout all.
Therefore, whatever has been created through the former expression is only what it is through that expression, while whatever has been created through the latter would not exist at all, unless it were something that it is not through this expression itself. There is, then, some one being which alone exists in the greatest and the highest degree of all. But that beyond which nothing greater can be thought cannot certainly be in the understanding alone. For so opposite are their relations, that the one never assumes the property of the other; so harmonious are they in nature, that the one ever contains the essence of the other. The Son may more appropriately be called the essence of the Father, than the Father the essence of the Son: and in like manner the Son is the virtue, wisdom, etc. This, however, it cannot be, unless it is what it is through itself, and all existing beings are what they are through it.
For that alone is just which thou dost will; and that alone unjust which thou dost not will. It is shown that a being than which a greater is inconceivable can be conceived, and also in so far, exists. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone good through itself. For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. De Libertate Arbitrii elaborates Anselm's reasoning on correctness with regard to.
For, because it is present in one place, it is not therefore prevented from being present at the same time, and in like manner in this, or that other, place or time. The analogy, however, between the expression of the Creator and the expression of the artisan is very incomplete. For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived of. Whence, it evidently follows, that whatever is created is created from something; for it is created either from something or from nothing. While opinions concerning Anselm's twin ontological arguments differ widely and have been from the moment the Proslogion was written , it is generally agreed that the argument is most convincing to Anselm's intended audience: that is, Christian believers seeking a rational basis for their belief in God. This love is not their Son.
For, apparently it is by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, because he is strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because he is swift. But it is evident that in no wise does anything exist through nothing. Thinking, therefore, that what I rejoiced to have found, would, if put in writing, be welcome to some readers, of this very matter, and of some others, I have written the following treatise, in the person of one who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeks to understand what he believes. It is no answer to it, for example, to deny that the idea of God is innate or universal The argument merely assumes that he who denies that there is a God must have an idea of God. When reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is not yet posited as existent, it is something thought, and rather opposed to Being than that this is subsumed under it.
Chapter 4 argues that there must be a highest level of dignity among existing things and that highest level must have a single member. For it is the property of the one to derive existence from the other, and the property of that other that the first derives existence from him. His father Gundulph or Gundulf was a noble, probably one of Adelaide's uncles or cousins; his mother Ermenberga was almost certainly the granddaughter of , related both to the Anselmid bishops of Aosta and to the heirs of who had been passed over in favour of Conrad. Therefore, thou art just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. From the mid-8th century, it had become customary that could not be without a woolen given or sent by the himself. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Hence, it must have been created for this end, that it might love the supreme Being.
For, just as to separate properties of separate beings, plurality is not attributed, since they are not properties of two things, so, what is common to both preserves an indivisible unity, although it belongs, as a whole, to them taken separately. For, since a man cannot be justness, but can possess justness, we do not conceive of a just man as being justness, but as possessing justness. It therefore does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word, through which all things were created. For they designate by the word substance that attribute of God which we designate by the word person. Hence, this Being must be living, wise, powerful, and all-powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever, in like manner, is absolutely better than what is not it.
For that every being, in so far as it exists, is like the supreme Being, reasons already considered do not permit us to doubt. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not appear to be the same thing. Let us first consider, separately, this supreme Nature, which exists through self; then these beings which exist through another. But, just as it has been proved that there is a being that is supremely good, since all goods are good through a single being, which is good through itself; so it is necessarily inferred that there is something supremely great, which is great through itself. . The supreme Being, then, will be divided into parts, according to the divisions of time. Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy London, 1882.
But how dost thou spare the wicked, if thou art all just and supremely just? Surely it is just that thou shouldst be so just that thou canst not be conceived more just; and this thou wouldst in no wise be if thou didst only render goods to the good, and not evils to the evil For, he who requiteth both good and evil according to their deserts is more just than he who so requites the good alone. We cannot understand that the Son is existent through the Father, and the Father through the Son, as if the one could not be existent except through the other, just as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom. This Nature was not brought into existence with the help of any external cause, yet it does not exist through nothing, or derive existence from nothing. Over the next two years, William opposed several of Anselm's efforts at reform—including his right to convene a council —but no overt dispute is known. Yield room for some little time to God; and rest for a little time in him. He also composed prayers to various saints.